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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

FREDERICK GERMONTO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020304-CA

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant/Appellant Frederick Germonto ("Appellant11 or "Germonto") was
convicted of Escape, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309
(1999). The Honorable Terry Christiansen, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah entered judgment on March 19, 2002. R. 179; see judgment in
Addendum A. Germonto filed a timely notice of appeal on April 8, 2002. This Court
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999) states:
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape - Consecutive sentences Definitions
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without
authorization.
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in section 76-1-601, or
causes serious bodily injury to another.

(3) Aggravated escape is afirstdegree felony.
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony.
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony.
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section
shall run consecutively with any other sentence.
(7) For purposes of this part:
(a) "Confinement" means:
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or
sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and
commitment and the sentence has not been terminated or
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest.
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure
confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to
an order of the court or sentenced and committed and the sentence
has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole.
A person is considered confined in the state prison if he:
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of
confinement from work release or home visit by the time
designated for return;
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation;
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment,
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by
correctional officers.
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and
includes persons under trustee status.
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Germonto left a group of prisoners that was being directed back to their
housing unit and climbed over an inner fence, but was apprehended prior to climbing
over the outer perimeter fence that divided prison and non-prison property. The issue in
2

this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to support a bindover on the charge of
escape where Germonto did not leave the total confinement of the prison.
Standard of Review: To support a bind-over, the state must introduce "sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant committed it." State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9,1J16, 20 P.3d 300. This requires the
State to present believable evidence as to each of the elements of the crime. IdL, ^fl3
(further citations omitted). In order to determine the elements of the crime, the court
must interpret the statute under which the defendant is charged. Interpretation of a
statute involves a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Maestas. 2000 UT App 22, ^[11, 997 P.2d 314 (further citation omitted).
Preservation of the Argument: This argument is preserved. R. 200:31; 20-22; 8385; 173. Germonto repeatedly challenged the bindover below; after the lower court
concluded that a completed escape could occur even if an inmate does not leave the
confines of the prison, Germonto entered a conditional plea of no contest, expressly
preserving his right to attack the propriety of the bindover order. R. 200:31; 20-22; 8385; 86-99; 113; 173-78; 202[2]:l-2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 9, 2000, the State filed an Information charging Germonto with Escape,
a second degree felony. R. 1-2. A preliminary hearing was held before Third District
Court Judge Denise Lindberg on August 17, 2000. R. 7, 200.
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Following the presentation of evidence at the preliminary hearing, Germonto
argued that he could not be bound over on the crime of escape because he had not left the
confines of the prison and therefore did not complete an escape. R. 200:31. After the
parties briefed the matter (R. 11-22), Judge Lindberg, acting as a magistrate, bound
Germonto over for trial on the charge of escape. R. 83; see. Bindover Order in
Addendum B.
Although Judge Lindberg acted as the magistrate, the case was also bound over to
her. R. 85, 106, 202, 202[2]:2. Germonto filed a pro se motion to quash the bindover,
labeled as a petition for rehearing, which Judge Lindberg denied. R. 86-88; 202[2]:l-2.
The case was later transferred to Judge Christiansen in West Valley City. R. 102, 108.
Germonto renewed his motion to dismiss. R. 113. Germonto also challenged the State's
ability to ask for a lesser included offense instruction of attempted escape when it was
proceeding on the escape charge based on an incomplete escape. R. 127-28.
On March 19, 2002, Germonto entered a conditional plea of no contest, expressly
reserving his right to appeal the adverse rulings regarding the propriety of the bindover.
R. 173. This appeal follows.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following evidence was introduced at the preliminary hearing:
On February 5, 2000, Germonto was an inmate at the Utah State Prison. R. 200:5.
On that date, prison guard Douglas Vamer was escorting Germonto and other prisoners
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back from the chapel to their housing unit in the Timpanogos facility of the prison.
R. 200:1, 5. The guard checked the chapel to make sure that no inmates had remained
behind. R. 200:5-6. He then followed the inmates as they proceeded toward the
Timpanogos facility. R. 200:6.
As he walked behind the group, Varner noticed Germonto about halfway up a ten
foot chain link fence. R. 200:8. That fence separated the inmate housing yard from the
outer perimeter area of the prison, and did not have razor wire at the top. R. 200:7-8, 10.
Varner gave Germonto a verbal command to get off the fence. R. 200:8.
Germonto proceeded over the inner fence into an area in the prison in which inmates are
not allowed. R. 200:7, 10. Germonto then ran toward the second or outer perimeter
fence and attempted to climb it. R. 200:10-11.
Varner notified the prison guards who were responsible for perimeter security.
R. 200:11. The perimeter guards drove to the place on the outer fence where Germonto
was attempting to climb the fence. R. 200:11. The guard told Germonto to get off the
fence and pulled a gun. R. 200:21. Germonto dropped from the inside of the fence onto
the prison grounds and began to run southbound on prison grounds parallel to the outer
fence. R. 200:11-12, 17, 20. Germonto stopped running when he reached a certain
point. R. 220:13. Germonto stood around for several minutes before he was taken back
into custody. R. 200:14.
Officers searched Germonto and found that he was wearing multiple layers of
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clothing. R. 200:24. In addition, Germonto told an officer that if he had one more
minute, he would have made it over the outer perimeter fence. R. 200:24.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The plain language of the escape statute requires that a person leave "official
custody" in order to commit the crime of escape. The statute defines "official custody"
for an inmate such as Germonto as "confinement in a state prison." The statute defines
"confinement" for an inmate such as Germonto as being "housed in a state prison." The
plain language of the statute therefore indicates twice that a prison inmate must leave the
confinement of the prison in order to leave official custody and commit the crime of
escape. Because the trial court did not require that an inmate leave the confinement of
the prison in order to commit a completed escape, it did not follow the plain language of
the statute. The trial court's ruling that the state presented sufficient evidence to bind
Germonto over on the charge of escape must be reversed because the state did not
present any evidence demonstrating that Germonto left the confines of the prison.
Requiring that an inmate leave the confines of the prison in order to commit a
completed escape saves the escape statute from an unconstitutional interpretation. If the
statute were interpreted to allow an escape even though the inmate had not left the
confines of the prison, it would be unconstitutionally void for vagueness. A person of
ordinary intelligence would not have notice as to what conduct is prohibited and the
statute would be subject to arbitrary and discriminatory application if the escape statute
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were interpreted to allow a completed escape even if the inmate did not leave the
confines of the prison. Any time an inmate was located in an area in which he was not
permitted, the state would be free to file escape charges, thereby doing away with the
crime of attempted escape and allowing for arbitrary application of the escape statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT. UTAH'S ESCAPE STATUTE. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 76-8-309
(1999). REQUIRES A TOTAL DEPARTURE FROM PRISON
CONFINEMENT IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE THE COMPLETED
CRIME OF ESCAPE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999) defines the crime of escape as follows:
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape - Consecutive sentences Definitions
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without
authorization.
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in section 76-1-601, or
causes serious bodily injury to another.
(3) Aggravated escape is afirstdegree felony.
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony.
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony.
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section
shall run consecutively with any other sentence.
(7) For purposes of this part:
(a) "Confinement" means:
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or
sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and
commitment and the sentence has not been terminated or
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or
7

(iii) lawfully detained following arrest.
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure
confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to
an order of the court or sentenced and committed and the sentence
has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole.
A person is considered confined in the state prison if he:
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of
confinement from work release or home visit by the time
designated for return;
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation;
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment,
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by
correctional officers.
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and
includes persons under trustee status.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999).
In interpreting a statute, courts first consider the plain language of the statute.
Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson. 2002 UT App 221, lfl2, 51 P.3d 1288. In
considering the plain language of a statute, courts "'presume that the legislature used
each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning.5" Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29, ^[12, 24 P.3d 928
(citations omitted). Words in a statute that have a commonly accepted meaning should
be given that common, lay meaning unless there is an indication that the legislature
intended otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co., 2002 UT App 221, ^[12.
Courts consider other methods of statutory construction only when a statute is
ambiguous. The focus in analyzing the statute remains, however, on effectuating the
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legislative intent.
In construing a statute, our aim is to give effect to the legislature's intent in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. When doubt or
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an
analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions
harmonized in accordance with legislative intent and purpose. One of the
cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to
the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject. Further,
we have a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate
the legislative intent and avoid and /or save it from constitutional conflict
or infirmities.
Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm'n.. 2002 UT App 164, ^[6, 48 P.3d 252 (citing
In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 2000 UT 28, ^23, 1 P.3d 1074 (citations and quotations
omitted)).
The plain language of Utah's escape statute requires that an inmate leave the
confines of the prison in order to be guilty of escape. The escape statute plainly states
that "a prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without authorization."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(1). Subsection (7)(b) defines "official custody" as
"confinement in the state prison" for purposes of this case:
"Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or
confinement in a state prison, jail institution for secure confinement of
juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or
voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is considered confined in
the state prison if he:
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from
work release or home visit by the time designated for return;
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation;
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(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment,
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by
correctional officers.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(b) (emphasis added). The last sentence of subsection
(7)(b) clarifies that a person can be in "official custody" and therefore can be charged
with escape even if he is not actually being held in the prison on a felony commitment.
Instead, a person is in "official custody" if he is on work release, being held on a parole
violation, being held at a county jail on a prison commitment, or being transported to
court, the hospital or elsewhere. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7). None of the
circumstances outlined in the last sentence of subsection (7)(b) apply to Germonto.
Instead, he was in "official custody" due to his "confinement in the state prison." See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(b).
The escape statute defines "confinement" in subsection (7)(a). In Germonto's
case, the applicable definition of confinement is set forth in subsection (7)(a)(i) which
states in relevant part, "'Confinement5 means: (i) housed in a state prison . . . . " Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(a)(i). The statute essentially states in two places, then, that
"official custody" means being housed or confined in the state prison for a person such as
Germonto who is an inmate at the prison. In other words, the statute twice states that the
"official custody" from which a prison inmate must leave in order to be guilty of an
escape is confinement or housing in the prison. The plain language of the statute
therefore requires that an inmate who is housed at the prison "leaves official custody"
10

when he leaves the prison. In this case, where Germonto did not leave the confines of
the prison, he did not leave official custody. The element of leaving official custody
therefore cannot be proven and the state did not establish probable cause to believe that
Germonto committed the completed crime of escape.
Although decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting statutes with distinct
language provide little guidance in interpreting the language of Utah's escape statute, the
decision in State v. Gaines, 372 So.2d 552 (La. 1979) is worth noting because the statute
at issue in that case is similar to Utah's escape statute. The statute at issue in Gaines
defined escape as ffthe intentional departure . . . of a person imprisoned, committed,
detained, or otherwise in the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer .. .from any
place where such person is lawfully confined" Gaines, 372 So.2d at 554 (quoting La.
R.S. 14:110(A)) (emphasis added). The court concluded that "any place where [a person
is] legally confined'1 must necessarily be a place with physical barriers where the person
is actually confined. Id at 555. In reaching that determination, the court recognized that
n

[a]ny less definitive or more ambiguous definition of the place of confinement would

render the statute unconstitutionally vague.tf Id. (citing inter alia Papchristou v.
Jacksonville. 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972)). In addition, the court
recognized that even if the language were ambiguous, any ambiguity must be resolved in
favor of the defendant. Gaines, 372 So.2d at 554. Because Gaines departed from an
okra patch on prison grounds where he was on work detail but did not otherwise leave
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the confinement or boundaries of the prison, the court held that he did not commit an
escape when he ran from the line where he was working and continued running even
after the guard told him to stop and fired shots. Id. at 553-54.
Like the statute in Gaines, if Utah's escape statute were interpreted to allow a
conviction for escape when an inmate has not left the confines of the prison, the statute
would be void for vagueness. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it: (1) fails to
provide a "person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited . . . " ; (2) "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application"; or (3) inhibits the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108, 108-09(1972). If Utah's
statute is interpreted so that an escape occurs even though the inmate has not left the
official custody or confinement of the prison, the statute would violate the first two of
these prohibitions.
First, the statute would be unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary
intelligence would not have notice as to what conduct is prohibited. The statute itself
defines "official custody" as confinement in the state prison, and defines "confinement"
as being "housed in the state prison." While the statute defines the term "confinement,"
that term also has an ordinary and commonly understood meaning that is consistent with
the statutory definition. "Confinement" means imprisonment or being confined, i.e.
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being held within a boundary or bounded region. Webster's New World College
Dictionary 306 (4th ed. 1999). A person of ordinary intelligence could not read the
escape statute and be given notice that he would be guilty of a completed escape even if
he did not leave the confines of the prison. The escape statute therefore is
unconstitutionally vague if interpreted to allow a conviction for a completed escape even
though the inmate did not leave the confines of the prison.
Second, the statute would be unconstitutionally vague if interpreted to allow a
completed escape even though Germonto did not leave prison grounds because such an
interpretation would leave prison guards, judges and juries to decide whether an escape
occurred any time an inmate entered a restricted area or even left his cell when he was
not supposed to do so. The escape statute would be enforced arbitrarily to convict some
inmates who venture out of their cells or escape while subjecting others only to
administrative sanctions based on the whim of the guards and not on legislative mandate.
Because the statute would give too much discretion to decide which cases should be
prosecuted as escapes, it would be void for vagueness if interpreted to allow an escape
conviction even though the inmate did not leave prison grounds.
Under the trial court's interpretation of the escape statute, the statute is
unconstitutionally vague because individuals are not given notice of what conduct is
prohibited and such interpretation allows for arbitrary and discriminatory application. In
order to "save [the statute] from constitutional conflicts or infirmities" (Intermountain
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Slurry Seal 2002 UT App 164, ^|6), the trial court's interpretation must be rejected and
instead the plain language of the statute requiring that an inmate leave the confinement of
the prison in order to commit an escape must be upheld.
Requiring that an inmate leave the confines of the prison in order to commit the
crime of escape by leaving official custody is consistent not only with the plain language
of the statute and constitutional concerns, but also with the portion of the code that
outlines the elements for attempt crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). "[A]
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting
a substantial step toward commission of the offense." IdL. The attempt statute further
requires not only that any step toward the crime be significant but also that any conduct
be "strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense" in order to be a
substantial step establishing the crime of attempt. Id.
If any conduct on prison grounds by an inmate who moves to an area that is
restricted or in which he is not supposed to be is considered a completed escape, the
crime of attempted escape is eviscerated. In other words, any conduct constituting a
substantial step toward the crime of escape that evidences the intent to escape is an
escape under the rationale employed by the trial court. Any time an inmate is out of his
cell when he is not supposed to be, in the cell of another inmate, disregards the order of a
guard, or otherwise moves "out of bounds," the state could charge the inmate with a
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completed escape. Such an approach goes against the legislative intent that an inmate
must leave official custody by leaving the confinement of the prison in order to commit a
completed escape, and does away with the crime of attempted escape.
The trial court's interpretation also disregards the purposes and principles of
construction set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104 (1999). That code section requires
that the provisions of the code be interpreted so that the elements of a crime are clearly
defined, the penalties are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and arbitrary or
oppressive treatment is prevented. In addition to failing to give notice of the conduct that
is prohibited and allowing for arbitrary enforcement, the lower court's interpretation also
violates section 76-1-104 because it allows for a punishment that is disproportionate to
the crime. An inmate who does not leave the confinement of the prison nevertheless
receives the same second degree felony punishment that is given to an inmate who leaves
the prison.
In addition, as Germonto pointed out in his pro sefilings,the prison has
administrative rules for internally punishing inmates who move into restricted areas or
who are otherwise "out of bounds." R. 86-7. When an inmate leaves his or her assigned
area, the prison has the ability to impose sanctions. Leaving the assigned area is not the
same as "leaving official custody" and is appropriately punished internally by restricting
the inmate's privileges, transferring the inmate to a more secure section, requiring that
the inmate be locked down for a significant portion of the day, or imposing other
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appropriate internal sanctions. The ability of the prison to impose internal sanctions
when an inmate leaves his assigned area further demonstrates that in this case where the
evidence showed that Germonto moved into a restricted area but did not leave the prison,
he did not leave official custody, as required by the escape statute. See. generally State v.
Liggett, 363 So.2d 1184, 1186 (La. 1978) (inmate who did not report for work and who
was later found in another section of the prison was subject to prison disciplinary rules
but did not commit crime of escape); People v. Lavaie. 70 Cal. App. 4th 456, 462 (1999)
(inmate was subject to prison disciplinary rules but did not commit crime of escape
where guards saw two men walking toward the front gate of the prison at 1:00 a.m., and
defendant was missing from bed count but was later found within a restricted area inside
the prison).
In this case, there was not probable cause to believe Germonto committed the
completed crime of escape because there is no evidence that he left the confines of the
prison. While the evidence demonstrated that Germonto climbed over the inner fence,
ran through a restricted area, then began to climb the outer perimeter fence, there is no
evidence that he got over the outer boundary fence and left the prison. Although the
state presented sufficient evidence to bind Germonto over on the charge of attempted
escape, the state failed to establish probable cause to bind Germonto over on the charge
of escape. The trial court therefore erred in refusing to quash the bindover on that
charge.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Frederick Germonto, by and through counsel, respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the lower court's ruling upholding the bindover order,
and remand the case to allow him to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty.
DATED this Xtu

day of November, 2002.

C~2a**.0. udcubf
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

KAREN STAM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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. .JDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE Oh U I AH
SALT LAKE COUNTY WFRT VA! LFY OFPT.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Plaintiff,

Case No. - i v 1i
Count No. P V U "^

vs

Honorable f

\ ,,

1^121

^ A.

Clerk X i h ^ t U | .
Reporter,__

i

Bailiff
Date r \ \< \

__l r 'i J - V J ^ C ' V

n

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
f'he miotion of
impose sentence accordingly is Q granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty;
s& plea of no contest; of the offense of { * /(. * >t- \ ^ r i > ^ (\±}( tf, \ ( ::. \ <-A \ j
, a felony
n
of the HL degree. a class
misdemeanor, being now p r e s e n t i n c o u r l ^
and
represented by \C £ > \ ^ t-x-N , and the State being represented byfo, \^ \(s(»{\ ^istfiow adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
-^
•
to a indeterminate term not to exceed one year, a at defendant's election.
o
to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be life;
^JBr not to exceed five years;
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
•
not to exceed
years;
ill
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_
•
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

jzf
[II
i :i

±

such sentence is to run concurrently with_LAj->Ai_-£>Lv_i -i~ ( r->
such sentence is to run consecutively with.
upon motion of • State, • Defense, D Court, Court(s)

.,u.

4-i

are hereby dismiss

Hi
II

•

Defendant is granted a stay of above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of.
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this judgment and commitment.
Commitment shall issue

\

> U - l t.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
ISTRtCT COURT JUDG^

Defense Counsel
Pagt>__L.ul

Deputy C(i. \ -*.*: •* n(White-Coi irt)

(Yellow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P)

(Pink-Defense)

I -

ADDENDUM B

IN THL-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRK 1 t u i KT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST.A'' o; i
w.\\Mvnn>.\RTMEN'I
)

STATE OF UTAH

"

•

)
)

VS.

:

NIX >V| K OK 1)1 \(

)

FREDERICK .1 (iERMONU
_

)
)

Case No. 00140027.'

)

reliminary Hearing was held in mis u i ^ ui
. , _*. )0 on a ch-d; L;C ot Escape
,u
~~1 Custody, a second degree felony. Fo -presentation of evidence the ( \ . r
asKcu me parties to provide legal memoranda sup}
<n guments. Having considerec the
evidence and the legal arguments presented, and res<
JI- ;bts in favor of the Prosecutnn v-t
this stage of the proceedings, the Court determines thai uiv Mate has met its ]-•• *••" ^" J
probable cause to bind Defendant over to sund *~. i1 o- *h" *h'V""
c

• ui«dispun.u ;av.i. .n this case are that on or about February 6, 2000 the Defendant, Mr.
Uerino.iiw, was a prisoner at the Utah State Prison. On that date Officer Varner was escorting
prisoners, including the Defendant, back, to a housing unit in the Timpanogos facility of the
prison. The Officer observed that the Defendant had broken away from the group and was
scaling a fence separating the inmate housing yard from the outer perimeter of the prison. Officer
Varner ordered Defendant to stop but Defendant crossed over the fence into an area where
inmates are not permitted under any circumstances, and ran towards the outer perimeter fences.
Officer Varner notified perimeter security, which drove to the site on the perimeter fence where
Mr. Germonto was attempting to climb. Upon seeing the officers Mr. Germonto dropped from
the fence and attempted to evade security by running parallel to the perimeter fence. In
connection with the efforts to stop Mr. Germonto the officers orally instructed him to stop and
displayed their weapons. Mr. Germonto was eventually subdued after running approximately 100
yards. He was searched, found to be wearing multiple layers of clothing, a. State-issued winter
coat, gloves and other protective apparel.
At the i'leliiitiiuiy 1 fearing Defendant's ai gument was a challenge to what constitutes
ape from official custody " In Utah, the crime of escape from official custody requires a (i)
. * nig, (ii) from, official custodx {defined as 'confinement'), (iii) without authorization. At the
hearing Defendant effectivel) conceded that the State had made a case for "attempted escape" but
argued Thai his actions could not, as a matter of law, constitute "escape" since he had never
. hed the final perimeter fence. The subsequent briefing by defense counsel addressed these
. -nil in greater detail, citing to two cases (from I ouisiana and Missouri) where the courts did not
tiiid "escape" had been completed. Urging the Court to give the term "escape' 1 its normal and
oi dmary meaning, Defendant's counsel argued that as long as the Defendant had not left the

geographic boundaries of the prison, the charge of "escape" could not lie Relying on the
statutory definition of "confinement" the State argued that Defendant "completed the crime of
escape when he left the housing area of the Timpanogos Unit," Reply Brief at 2, when he scaled
the first fence separating the housing area
At the outset, the Court notes that while the issue raised in this case does not appear to
have been decided in Utah, by far the majority view is that prisoners may be convicted of "escape"
even where they fail to leave the confines of a prison or institution See annotation, Conviction
for Escape Where Prisoner Fails to Leave Confines of Prison or Institution, 79 A L R 4Ul 1060
Indeed, it appears that only Louisiana and Missouri courts have held otherwise, and those few
cases are clearly distinguishable In the Louisiana case, State v. Games, the prisoner had been
assigned to work in an okra patch that was part of the prison grounds not restricted to inmates
The Louisiana court read the applicable state statute to require the prisoner's departure from a
physical place of confinement Since the prisoner in that case had never left the penitentiary
grounds the court reversed the conviction for escape In this Court's view, Utah's statute is
different in that it clearly evinces a legislative intent to define "confinement" to include more than
the physical location Moreover, factually the Games case is distinguishable in that despite being
ordered to desist, Mr Germonto scaled a fence and entered an area from which inmates are
restricted at all times In other words, there is no conceivable circumstance under which Mr.
Germonto would have been authorized to be in the area between the housing fences and the
external perimeter fences The Missouri case, State v. Buck is also clearly distinguishable on its
facts There the prisoner was charged with escape although he never made any effort to leave
even the interior walls of the housing unit, but merely went into another cell where he then
sexually assaulted that cell's occupant The Missouri court did note in Buck that escape occurred
when "custodial detention had been breached " That certainly occurred in this case
Utah's statute is inartfully drafted Nevertheless, it is evident from the face of the statute,
specifically Utah Code Ann § 76-8-309(7)(b)(i-iv), that the Legislature viewed the term
"confinement in a state prison" to include situations clearly occurring outside the geographic
boundaries of the institution Thus, Defendant's attempt to limit the definition of confinement to
a geographic boundary cannot be reconciled with the statutory language
The only way to make sense of the examples of "confinement in a state prison" cited in the
statute is to construe the terms to include those instances where the custodial authority has actual
or constructive control over the inmate Accord Urbauer v. State, 744 P 2d 1274 (Ct Crim App
1987) ("custody" may be restraint by either physical means or by a superior force acting as a
moral restraint But there must be actual or constructive custody in order to have an escape
[a]ny departure from such restraint or control, . . whether from the custody of an officer or from
any place where one is lawfully confined may be adjudged an escape "). Here, Mr Germonto
defied a proper demand by custodial authorities (initially Officer Varner, and later by perimeter
security) that he descend from the fences which he did, or tried to, scale) Construing the
evidence in favor of the prosecution, Mr Germonto intentionally disregarded the orders he was
given and entered an area in which he had no right to be By doing so he placed himself outside
actual or constructive official custody without authorization, completing the elements of "escape
from official custody "

The Defendant is bound over to stand trial for Escape from Official Custody a Secoi id
Degree Felony.

Dated Scptcmbei 8, *!<>(><>
By the Court:

